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Making	sense	of	the	uncertainty	following
Catalonia’s	declaration	of	independence
Catalonia	faces	an	uncertain	future	following	the	events	of	the	last	month,	but	the	regional	elections
now	scheduled	for	21	December	are	likely	to	be	a	key	moment	in	determining	its	trajectory.	Mariana
S.	Mendes	assesses	how	the	crisis	developed	following	the	1	October	referendum,	arguing	that	by
calling	early	elections,	the	Spanish	government	has	attempted	to	give	the	pro-independence	bloc
little	opportunity	to	build	momentum	behind	their	resistance	efforts,	but	that	if	pro-independence
parties	take	power	in	the	vote,	the	crisis	could	escalate	again.
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A	surreal	month	in	Spain’s	political	life	ended	the	way	the	Catalan	and	the	Spanish	governments	had	promised	to
start	it	–	with	a	unilateral	declaration	of	independence	on	27	October	followed	by	the	suppression	of	Catalonia’s
autonomy.	Uncompromising	positions	took	the	lead	and	neither	authorities	in	Madrid	nor	in	Barcelona	showed	the
necessary	will	or	statesmanship	to	avoid	the	greatest	political	crisis	Spain	has	faced	since	the	end	of	Franco’s
era.
That	it	took	the	pro-independence	bloc	27	days	to	proclaim	independence	rather	than	the	48	hours	promised
following	the	1	October	referendum	shows,	however,	that	attempts	were	made	at	avoiding	such	a	drastic
measure.	Potentially	important	factors	in	this	were	dissenting	voices	within	the	ruling	coalition,	firms	withdrawing
from	Catalonia,	and	the	lack	of	international	support.
The	ambiguous	announcement	of	a	‘suspended	declaration	of	independence’	on	10	October	–	to	make	room	for
dialogue	with	Madrid	–	highlighted	the	conundrum	that	the	head	of	the	Generalitat,	Carles	Puigdemont,	had	to
confront.	On	the	one	hand,	pro-independence	hardliners	threatened	to	withdraw	their	support	and	break	up	the
pro-independence	parliamentary	majority	if	independence	was	not	declared.	On	the	other	hand,	pro-
independence	pragmatists	were	alarmed	by	the	potentially	high	costs	of	such	a	move	–	visible	in	the	more	than
one	thousand	firms	that	moved	their	headquarters	out	of	Catalonia	–	and	preferred	to	take	a	more	cautious
approach.
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To	be	sure,	no	one	inside	the	ruling	pro-independence	coalition	expected	the	Spanish	government	to	react	with
complacency.	What	many	certainly	hoped	for	was	that	Madrid’s	response	would	help	move	Catalonia	a	step
further	to	independence.	If	the	Spanish	authorities	reacted	with	a	heavy	hand,	the	case	for	separation	would	be
further	strengthened	and	so	would	support	for	independence	–	which	still	requires	a	convincing	majority	within
Catalonia	itself.	If	instead	Madrid	had	accepted	Puigdemont’s	call	for	dialogue,	he	would	be	given	some	leeway	to
negotiate	possible	concessions:	potentially	the	acceptance	of	constitutional	changes	allowing	for	a	legal
referendum,	or,	as	a	second	best	option,	a	reform	of	the	Statute	of	Autonomy.	At	a	minimum,	he	would	have
sought	to	avoid	the	suppression	of	Catalonia’s	autonomy	and	what	is	most	likely	a	long	prison	sentence	for	him.
But	Madrid’s	authorities	did	not	need	to	tie	themselves	to	either	model.	Instead,	they	followed	the	‘carrot	and
stick’	approach	of	Puigdemont.	Whereas	the	latter’s	‘carrot’	was	a	proposal	for	dialogue	–	while	keeping	the
potential	stick	of	a	blunt	declaration	of	independence	on	hand	–	Madrid’s	‘carrots’	were	a	series	of	requests	that
Puigdemont	would	have	to	abide	by	if	they	were	not	to	apply	article	155	of	the	Spanish	Constitution	–	the	‘nuclear
option’	of	suspending	Catalonia’s	autonomy	and	deposing	the	regional	government.
Arguably,	these	were	difficult	‘carrots’	for	Puigdemont	to	accept:	first,	a	request	to	make	clear	whether
independence	had	been	declared	or	not	and,	second,	a	demand	to	“return	to	the	legal	and	constitutional	order”
(which,	according	to	sources	inside	the	executive,	would	require	Puigdemont	to	call	for	snap	regional	elections).
This	was	part	of	a	series	of	exchanges	in	which	each	side	sought	to	pass	the	buck	to	the	other	to	make	their
counterpart	appear	to	be	the	one	ultimately	to	blame.	The	situation	would	turn	into	something	of	a	catch-22,	with
Madrid	first	threatening	to	use	article	155	in	case	of	a	declaration	of	independence	and	Puigdemont	later
threatening	to	respond	with	a	full	declaration	of	independence	if	article	155	was	applied.	The	central
government’s	possession	of	a	‘nuclear	option’,	however,	put	the	bargaining	power	in	its	hands	and	proved
enough	to	tilt	the	balance	against	Puigdemont.
Though	at	first	he	did	not	give	a	clear	answer	to	the	Spanish	government’s	request	and	offered	a	meeting	with
Rajoy	as	a	counter-proposal	(16	October),he	would	eventually	recognise	independence	had	not	yet	taken	place,
in	a	letter	on	19	October.	This	was,	however,	insufficient	for	the	conservative	executive	in	Madrid,	who
considered	Puigdemont’s	failure	to	comply	with	its	second	request	–	a	“return	to	legal	order”	–	sufficient	reason	to
move	forward	with	the	application	of	article	155,	approved	by	the	cabinet	on	21	October.
The	lengths	to	which	Puigdemont	was	ready	to	go	to	escape	from	this	situation	were	made	clear	on	26	October,
the	day	before	the	Senate	was	set	to	vote	the	application	of	article	155.	On	that	day,	and	with	the	help	of
mediators,	the	head	of	the	Generalitat	negotiated	a	call	for	elections	in	exchange	for	the	non-application	of	article
155	–	the	sort	of	capitulation	the	Spanish	government	had	asked	for	the	week	before.	However,	and	in	the	words
of	Puigdemont	himself,	he	did	not	receive	enough	guarantees	from	the	Spanish	government	and	therefore	was
left	with	no	option	but	to	leave	the	door	open	for	the	Catalan	Parliament	to	declare	independence	the	next	day.
The	precise	guarantees	he	was	seeking	are	still	unclear,	with	some	assuming	the	Spanish	government	simply
refused	his	deal	and	others	indicating	that	a	suspension	of	article	155	(after	the	Senate’s	approval)	was	still
possible	but	that	Puigdemont	did	not	trust	the	Spanish	government	would	do	it.	Plus,	the	damaging
consequences	that	a	call	for	elections	(and	a	non-declaration	of	independence)	would	have	for	the	future	of	both
his	coalition	and	Puigdemont’s	own	party	are	also	said	to	have	played	an	important	role	in	his	final	move.
And	to	be	clear,	it	seems	quite	unlikely	we	would	have	seen	the	Spanish	central	government	going	back	on	the
decision	to	apply	article	155.	This	is	what	everyone	inside	the	ruling	conservative	–	and	within	other	circles	–	had
been	asking	for.	The	central	government’s	response	had	so	far	been	anchored	on	the	rule	of	law	rather	than	on
politics	(if	one	understands	politics	as	the	art	of	compromise)	and	was	therefore	unlikely	to	change	–	with	the
obvious	added	convenience	that	the	law	suits	its	centralist	position.	Its	previous	requests	to	the	Generalitat	might
well	have	just	been	an	attempt	to	gain	time	to	decide	on	the	contours	of	article	155	and,	in	the	process,	watch	the
pro-independence	bloc	either	break	up	or	give	the	central	government	definitive	reasons	to	intervene.
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All	in	all,	what	we	have	seen	is	a	game	of	realpolitik	in	which	the	unequal	balance	of	power	and	a	general	non-
cooperative	stance	produced	the	current	outcome.	The	interactions	between	authorities	in	Madrid	and	Barcelona
lend	themselves	particularly	well	to	game	theory	analysis,	according	to	which	the	attempt	to	maximise	relative
positions	leads	to	the	worst	possible	collective	outcome.	The	incentives	for	conflict	or	cooperation	were,	however,
unequally	distributed,	reflecting	their	different	power	positions.
The	Catalan	government’s	(late)	attempts	at	pursuing	a	cooperative	stance	were	commendable	from	a	moral
point	of	view,	but	also	have	to	be	put	in	context	as	Puigdemont	had	more	to	lose	from	a	non-negotiated	outcome,
and	the	Spanish	government	had	little	or	nothing	to	gain	from	a	negotiated	solution	at	that	point.	Madrid’s
ownership	of	a	‘nuclear	option’	meant	it	could	more	easily	afford	a	non-cooperative	stance,	simply	because	the
suppression	of	regional	autonomy	will	likely	nullify	the	declaration	of	independence	and	possibly	turn	the	game
into	a	win-lose	situation	for	Madrid.
This	is,	of	course,	the	case	only	if	there	is	no	massive	resistance	effort	in	Catalonia,	with	civil	servants	refusing	to
take	direct	orders	from	Madrid	and	street	activists	creating	disruption.	This	does	not	seem	to	be	happening	thus
far,	in	part	because	the	central	government	played	it	smart	and	called	for	regional	elections	for	21	December,
making	the	period	of	direct	rule	as	short	as	possible.	The	strategy	is	to	give	the	pro-independence	bloc	little
opportunity	to	build	momentum	behind	their	resistance,	and	to	redirect	their	efforts	towards	the	electoral	contest.
It	is	far	from	sustainable	in	the	long-run,	though,	as	the	election	results	might	place	in	power	pro-independence
forces	again,	in	which	case	Madrid	better	prepare	to	make	some	credible	concessions	or	face	another	trial	of
strength.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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